Magistrates Court proceeding

In the Magistrates Court, Nguarampaa Ltd argued that the Crown had not properly acquired the land in question meaning they did not need to pay the Council rates.

Nguarampaa Ltd contended that the Crown had not legitimately acquired the land, meaning the Council had no right to charge them rates. The Magistrate considered this question a matter for a higher court.

Having determined that there was no real prospect for Ngurampaa Ltd to successfully defend the claim, the Magistrate struck out the claim and awarded summary judgment in favour of the Council to recover the overdue rates.

Supreme Court proceeding

Rather than appeal the Magistrates Court decision, Ngurampaa Ltd applied to the Supreme Court for a stay of the Magistrate's order to prevent it from being carried out.

Ngurampaa Ltd also sought for the matter to be referred to the High Court of Australia and contended that there was a jurisdictional issue. This argument was rejected by Philippides J.

The Council made a number of arguments as to why Nguarampaa Ltd should be denied relief. 

The Crown's sovereignty is not justiciable in Australian courts

According to Philippides J, the crux of Ngurampaa Ltd's argument was that the Euahlayi People's Republic claimed sovereignty over the land in opposition to the Australian Crown. By making this challenge, Ngurampaa Ltd argued that Australian domestic laws do not apply to the Euahlayi People's Republic.

Philippides J viewed Ngurampaa Ltd's argument as facing 'an insurmountable difficulty' [13] for several reasons:

1. Philippides J held that Britain's acquisition of sovereignty over the Australian continent is not justiciable before Australian courts according to Mabo v The State of Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1. This was affirmed in Coe v Commonwealth (1993) 118 ALR 193, where Mason CJ stated that the Mabo decision is 'entirely at odds with the notion that sovereignty adverse to the Crown resides in the Aboriginal people of Australia… [or that] there resides in the Aboriginal people a limited kind of sovereignty… [which entitles the] to self-government' [14]. Philippides J highlighted similar findings in Walker v The State of New South Wales (1994) 182 CLR 45 and Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v State of Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422. As such, Philippides J concluded that a challenge to the acquisition of sovereignty 'cannot be sustained as a matter of law' [17].
2. When the Crown claimed sovereignty over Australia, international law recognised that inhibited lands could be validly claimed by 'settlement'. Philippides J held that this meant it did not matter that both respondents did not possess any documents, contracts or treaties to show the Euahlayi People's Republic surrendered or ceded their land. 
3. Upon acquiring sovereignty, the Crown also attained radical title over the land. Radical title gave the Crown certain rights over the land which could not be superseded by common law native title. Accordingly, Philippides J held that no native title rights exempted Ngurampaa Ltd from State legislation.
4. Ngurampaa Ltd claimed that the land was invalidly acquired under the 'grants by deceitful fraud' doctrine. Philippides J considered this 'ancient' doctrine to be of 'diminishing importance' because it applied in the past where the King issued land grants [23]. Philippides J held that the doctrine did not apply in these circumstances as land grants are now made by statutory authorities governed by administrative law.
5. Philippides J dismissed Ngurampaa Ltd's argument that 'a subsisting Continental common law' existed in Australia prior to colonisation [26]. The only common law that existed was English common law. Philippides J also rejected Ngurampaa Ltd's reliance on Commonwealth v Yarmirr (1999) 101 FCR 171. This case concerned a native title determination regarding seas and related waters and did not advance Nguarampaa Ltd's position in any meaningful way.